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The 0.3-m Transonic Cryogenic Tunnel (TCT) at the NASA Langley 
Research Center was built in 1973 as a facility intended to be used for no 
more than 60 hours in order to verify the validity of the cryogenic wind 
tunnel concept at transonic speeds. The role of the 0.3-m TCT has gradually 
changed until now, after over 3000 hours of operation, it is classified as 
a major NASA research facility and, under the administration of the 
Experimental Techniques Branch, it is used extensively for the testing of 
airfoils at high Reynolds numbers and for the development of various 
technologies related to the efficient operation and use of cryogenic 
wind tunnels. 
Over the years, as a direct result of the changing research 
roles of the 0.3-m TCT, additions and modifications have been made to 
the physical equipment of the facility as well as to the procedures used 
in its operation. 
The purpose of this report is to document the results of a 
recent safety analysis of the 0.3-m TCT facility. This analysis was made 
as part of an on-going programme with the Experimental Techniques Branch 
designed to ensure that the existing equipment and current operating 
procedures of the 0.3-m TCT facility are acceptable in terms of today's 
standards of safety for cryogenic systems. 
1. 
2. GENERAL OVERVIEW 
The 0.3-m Transonic Cryogenic Tunnel has been in operation since 
1973 and in general its performance has been satisfactory. The tunnel 
operates at temperatures as low as 77K and at pressures up to 6 atmospheres 
absolute. It is cooled by injecting liquid nitrogen into a circulating 
nitrogen gas stream which is exhausted in a controlled way to compensate 
for the increased gas volume arising from the vaporizing liquid nitrogen. 
The operation of the tunnel involves the storage of liquid 
nitrogen received from an outside supplier, the transmission of liquid 
nitrogen to the tunnel by pump and the exhaustion of gaseous nitrogen from 
the tunnel. In general these operations would be expected to lead to the 
potential exposure of personnel and equipment to the following hazards: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Asphyxiation due to oxygen deficiency. 
Freezing of human tissue due to excessive cold. 
Failure of metal parts and materials which are not 
suitable for use at low temperatures. 
(4) Over-pressurization failures due to the vaporization 
of trapped liquid nitrogen. 
(5) Failures due to differential contraction and expansion. 
(6) Fires and explosions caused by condensed atmospheric 
air coming in contact with combustible material. 
(7) Fog formation and icing due to escape or intentional 
release of cold fluid. 
(8) Exposure to excessive noise. 
(9) Incorrect installation of cryogenic equipment. 
(10) Inadequate training to alert personnel on hazards 
which are alien to normal experience. 
(11) Inadequate provision of rescue equipment. 
My general findings in regard to the above safety points were 
that, whilst the personnel responsible for the tunnel were aware of most 
if not all of the points, they were not in all instances taking active 
steps to ensure the elimination of the hazards. 
2. 
It was noticeable for instance that several lines, which could 
be chilled to the condensation temperature for air, were insulated with 
rubber-like flammable material. A test confirmed that this material would 
burn in air let alone in the oxygen enriched air which normally arises 
when air is partially condensed. Furthermore, the possibility of cold 
liquid nitrogen impinging on mild steel components was noted in several 
areas. The incorrect installation of several cryogenic valves was also 
noted. 
The highly dangerous asphyxiation hazard had been in the main 
competently dealt with but even here the safety measures were not completely 
foolproof. Noise would appear to present no problem as personnel normally 
do not enter the tunnel room when the unit is operational, but if in 
emergencies someone does have to enter the area it would probably be 
desirable for him to have ear protection. 
The problems of contraction and expansion appear to have been 
adequately dealt with. I found no unprotected points where liquid could be 
trapped. 
Time did not permit me to investigate the methods used to train 
new personnel but the level of understanding of the people I met on the site 
suggested that this area had been well covered. Because cryogenic accidents 
tend to occur infrequently, workers tend after a time to think the hazards 
they have been warned about never really arise. For this reason, retraining 
is important and, in this connection, talks by an outsider such as those I 
gave at Langley can be of considerable value. 
Breathing equipment was available for the purposes of rescue. 
Because very speedy action is called for in cases of asphyxiation, I would 
also recommend having one resuscitator on the site. 
3. PRODUCT RECEIPT 
3. 
Liquid nitrogen is purchased from an outside supplier and delivered 
to the site storage tanks by tanker which is connected to a delivery point 
located outside the storage tank compound. This point was found to be 
unlabelled and it is of prime importance that a label be provided. I also 
found that there was no attempt to check that the correct product was being 
delivered and, whilst it would not be disastrous if some oxygen (say) 
instead of nitrogen was fed to the tunnel, I think it desirable for a monitor 
to be fitted at or near the supply point to preclude this sort of error. 
4. LIQUID NITROGEN STORAGE AREA 
4.1 Storage Tanks - Cryogenic Protection 
The storage comprises 2 x 28,000 US gallon tanks which appear 
to be of the vacuum insulated type having a powder filling. 
The settling of the powder in the vacuum space of such tanks can 
lead to the top of the cold inner tank being able to "see" the mild steel 
outer shell and if this happens the transfer of heat by radiation can cool 
the outer shall to such an extent that it embrittles and cracks. As the 
tanks are fairly old, personnel should check that this is not happening by 
observing any excessive frost formation on top of the tanks. If it is 
suspected that the powder has settled, experts should be called in to top 
it up. If a crack is allowed to develop this will lead to loss of vacuum 
and excessive heat inleak and will call for a very expensive repair. 
Several vents are so located that they spray liquid nitrogen 
directly on to the top of the outer mild steel shells which could lead to 
cracking of an outer shell. One of the worst offenders is the big T vent 
which often overspills when liquid is being received from the tanker. Some 
of these, in particular the priming vent from the pump supplying liquid 
nitrogen to the tunnel which is said to discharge heavily upon occasion, 
could fairly easily be relocated to discharge between the tanks in the 
location of the present vent for precooling the nitrogen line to the tunnel. 
As it would be difficult and costly to relocate all the vents on top of the 
storage tanks, it is recommended that an aluminium shield be provided to 
di;ect liquid away from the top of each tank. 
4.2 Lines and Valves 
Insulation has been removed from a portion of the main filling 
line by people walking on it. A proper step should be provided. 
4. 
The main filling valves 3096M and 3097M are almost inaccessible. 
To really correct this would call for major pipeline rearrangement but some 
improvement could be obtained fairly easily by swinging the valves 450 to 
5. 
the vertical position - at this angle they would still function satisfactorily 
from the cryogenic viewpoint. 
Several cryogenic valves, e.g. 309lM, J098M, J099M, 3l00M, 3090M 
and 3061M, are located horizontally and should be raised to the vertical or 
near vertical position. 
4.3 Liquid Nitrogen Vaporizer 
For satisfactory and efficient operation, a vaporizer of the type 
installed should have a head of liquid at its lowest point to give the 
maximum differential head obtainable between the inlet and outlet sides, as 
this is the driving force for circulation. It was observed that the liquid 
feed line to the vaporizer had not been insulated. This line should be 
insulated right up to the point where it enters the vaporizer. 
Furthermore, the vaporizer control valves 3094M and 3095M are 
badly located and they should be moved to about 450 from the vertical. The 
small bottom draw valve to the vaporizer, 3093M, should be rotated 45 0 towards 
tank A to improve operator access. 
4.4 Tank Pressure Control Mercoid Switch 
In its present location it is very difficult to adjust the setting 
of this switch - it could usefully be swung round and forward. 
4.5 Barton Level Gauges 
These are at present located low down in an area which could easily 
become fogbound due to any leaks from the gland on the nitrogen circulation 
pump to the tunnel. They should be raised and brought forward. 
4.6 Temporary Test Station 
The present arrangement is such that anyone opening valve 307lN 
would almost certainly be asphyxiated with nitrogen. This valve should be 
blanked off or capped and if this unit is going to be used it would be better 
to move it to an area where there is more positive ventilation. 
6. 
4.7 Ventilation 
The fact that the storage area is bounded by high walls with only 
a few openings means that ventilation is restricted and that fog, once formed, 
will be slow to disperse. Operation of the vaporizer fan would assist but it 
might be better to establish more openings in the walls as a safeguard against 
asphyxiation and fog formation. 
Under high vent conditions liquid nitrogen splashing along between 
the tanks could vaporise at the far end of the enclosure and produce gas which 
might be suCked into the ventilation system of the nearby NTF pumphouse. 
Whilst I am told that an oxygen monitor is going to be provided in the pump-
house, arrangements should be made to warn anyone in the pumphouse in the 
event of a big spill. 
4.8 Housekeeping 
It is undesirable to use cryogenic tank areas for general storage. 
Metal staging and girders which I saw stored where people might want to walk 
or run between the tanks could prove very dangerous in the event of a spill 
leading to fog. Wooden boxes were also being stored as well as drums of 
acetone and other chemicals. There was also quite an accumulation of leaves. 
The concrete floor needs a good brush and, where necessary, broken 
concrete should be made good, preferably using high alumina cement whose extra 
cost should be justifiable as it would give a longer service life than 
ordinary concrete. 
5. LIQUID NITROGEN TRANSFER TO TUNNEL 
Transfer is accomplished using a 150 gal/min pump yielding a 
pressure of about 180 psi. 
For satisfactory operation the pump should be properly cooled down 
before it is started up and it should run with an adequate NPSH to avoid 
damaging cavitation. 
Cold liquid giving ideal suction conditions is best obtained by 
depressurizing and repressurizing the storage tank. This is done in the case 
of Tank A but not in the case of Tank B which is used to provide nitrogen gas 
for purging. I was told that the pump worked well on Tank A but not so well 
on Tank B and there might therefore be a case for having a separate system 
for generating purge gas so as to optimize pumping conditions from Tank B. 
In view of the asphyxiation hazard, it is important that there 
should be no flow of nitrogen to the tunnel when it is shut down. At present 
a manually operated double block and bleed system with four vents prevents 
this but I am concerned that this system could be overridden in error and 
that stop valves at the tunnel nozzles, which could easily leak, would be the 
only remaining safeguard. Automation of the control valves at the pump would 
reduce the hazard by giving an indication of valve settings in the control 
room but, in addition to this, a fully automated double bloCk and bleed near 
the line to the nozzles and closing off both the liquid feed line and the 
return line with an adequate vent in between leading outside the building 
could usefully be provided. 
6. TUNNEL 
For much of the time the tunnel is operated at pressures up to 
7. 
6 atmospheres. Above about 1.6 atmospheres the temperature will be too high 
to condense air. However, during startup and shutdown, and during any periods 
of low pressure operation, the possibility that air may condense leading to a 
potential combustion hazard should be recognised. 
6.1 Insulation 
Several instances were noted of lines on which air might condense 
having rubber-like flammable insulation. It would be better to replace this 
with non-combustible insulant. The main tunnel insulation is purged with 
nitrogen - a feature which should go a long way to preventing air and moisture 
condensation and maintaining the efficiency of the insulant. 
6.2 Cryogenic Valves 
Several of the cryogenic valves controlling the tunnel are wrongly 
located from the cryogenic viewpoint, e.g. 306lN, 3063N and 3062N. Ideally, 
all cryogenic valves should be located vertically or at a reasonably steep 
angle to the vertical. This provides a gas seal which prevents cold liquid 
reaching the gland where it will cause frosting and seizure. 
It was also noted that many of the cryogenic valves, e.g. 3062N 
8. 
and 306lN, are hydraulically operated and that hydraulic oil which could burn 
was leaking from their mechanisms. It is generally better to employ 
pneumatically actuated valves in cryogenic situations and this is recommended 
when a change becomes possible. Until this happens, every attempt should be 
made to collect the leaking oil in trays which should be cleaned out frequently 
to prevent oil accumulation. 
6.3 Flooring 
Oil dripping from the main fan bearings is damaging the floor at 
one end of the tunnel. It is not easy to think of a flooring material that 
would get round the problem. The simplest way would be to try to collect the 
oil in trays so that it never finds its way on the floor. 
6.4 Labelling and Warning Notices 
There is quite a complex line system around the tunnel but very 
few identification labels. Wherever possible labels with flow indication 
should be provided. Warning notices on the danger of asphyxiation should be 
provided at the larger tunnel openings and in the building itself. 
Warning notices should also be provided near the roof vents. 
6.5 Ventilation 
Until the additional safeguards referred to in Section 5 have been 
implemented, it would be useful to have a small fan ventilating air through 
the tunnel when it is opened up. 
6.6 Operation 
The methods of operation were discussed and appear to be satisfactory. 
It is recognized that operation of the tunnel at higher pressures and lower 
temperatures makes it more difficult to vaporize liquid and a careful watch has 
to be kept against excessive accumulation of liquid within the tunnel. The 
importance of avoiding moisture formation in the tunnel is also appreciated 
and appropriate steps are taken to prevent'this. 
9. 
Sticking valves due to their having been wrongly installed may 
have introduced operational difficulties from time to time. The modifications 
referred to in 6.2 should get round this. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The fact that this unit has operated without serious incident since 
1972 is a testimony to its general viability and to the quality and training 
of the personnel who have been associated with it. As a research tool, the 
plant has been designed to an unusually high standard - to meet rigorous 
industrial requirements in regard to operation and safety it could however be 
usefully modified here and there on the lines suggested in this report. As a 
visitor I was impressed by the efforts of staff at all levels to ensure that 
I was warned of tripping hazards and the like - visitors are so often neglected 
when it comes to safety. 
8. RECOMMENDATIONS 
From the viewpoints of operational viability and safety, some of 
the recommendations suggested in the report are more important than others. 
For this reason I have decided to present the recommendations as essential or 
desirable as indicated below: 
(a) Essential 
8.1 Identify product at liquid nitrogen filling point. 
8.2 Check powder has not settled excessively in storage tanks. 
8.3 Reposition easily moveable vents to direct liquid nitrogen 
away from the tanks. 
8.4 Provide an aluminium shield at the top of each storage tank 
to prevent any remaining vents splashing liquid on to the 
outer shells. 
8.S Reinsulate the liquid nitrogen filling line at point of damage 
and provide a protective cover to prevent further damage by 
walkers. 
8.6 Insulate vaporizer liquid feed line from storage tank outlet 
to vaporizer inlet. 
8. 7 l~emove or completely blank off Teml'orary Test Stalion. 
8.8 
8.9 
8.10 
Remove trip hazards and stored materials from storage area. 
Ensure NTF warned in case of major vent spill in storage area. 
Provide fully automated double block and bleed system venting 
to outside at liquid nitrogen inJet to tunnel. 
8.11 Replace rubber insulation wherever it is to be found on cold 
8.12 
8.13 
lines with non-combustible insulant. 
Ensure that all cryogenic valves are located vertically or 
in the near vertical position. 
Provide trays to collect oil where it occurs but do not 
allow oil in trays to accumulate. 
10. 
8.14 
8.15 
Improve product identification and flow indication throughout plant. 
Maintain an adequate procedure for traIning and retraining personnel. 
(b) Desirable 
8.16 
8.17 
8.18 
8.19 
8.20 
8.21 
8.22 
8.23 
8.24 
8.25 
Monitor product purity at the filling point to ensure that 
wrong product is not delivered. 
Relocate liquid nitrogen filling valves to storage to improve 
accessibility. 
Relocate Mercoid switch and Barton level gauges. 
Improve ventilation in storage area by increasing wall 
ventilation. 
Where broken, relay concrete in the storage tank area. 
Automate pump control v<llves to facilitate remote operation 
from the control room. 
Hydraulically operated cryogenic valves should be changed to 
pneumatic operation. 
Provide a small fan to ventilate air through the tunnel when 
shut down and opened up. 
Provide a resuscitator on the site. 
Provide ear protection for peroonnel naving to enter the 
tunnel room when the tunnel is working. 
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